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Abstract—Spoofing attacks are one of the security traits that
biometric recognition systems are proven to be vulnerable to.
When spoofed, a biometric recognition system is bypassed by
presenting a copy of the biometric evidence of a valid user. Among
all biometric modalities, spoofing a face recognition system is
particularly easy to perform: all that is needed is a simple
photograph of the user.
In this paper, we address the problem of detecting face spoofing
attacks. In particular, we inspect the potential of texture features
based on Local Binary Patterns (LBP) and their variations on
three types of attacks: printed photographs, and photos and
videos displayed on electronic screens of different sizes. For
this purpose, we introduce REPLAY-ATTACK, a novel publicly
available face spoofing database which contains all the mentioned
types of attacks. We conclude that LBP, with ∼15% Half Total
Error Rate, show moderate discriminability when confronted
with a wide set of attack types.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spoofing attack is the action of outwitting a biometric
sensor by presenting a counterfeit biometric evidence of a valid
user [1]. It is a direct attack to the sensory input of a biometric
system and the attacker does not need previous knowledge
about the recognition algorithm. Most of the biometric modali-
ties are not resistant to spoofing attacks: the biometric systems
are usually designed to only recognize identities without con-
cern whether the identity is live or not. Despite the existence
of very sophisticated biometric authentication and verification
systems nowadays, implementing anti-spoofing schemes for
them is still in its infancy.
Depending on the biometric modality being attacked, fab-
ricating fake biometric data can have different levels of diffi-
culty. While creating an artificial finger to spoof a fingerprint
recognition system, or printing contact lens to spoof an iris
recognition system may require some expertise, it is very easy
to create a copy of someone’s face. All that is needed is
a photograph of the person, which can be easily found on
the Internet or taken directly from the user at distance. The
assumptions that the artificial biometric evidence can bypass
a biometric recognition system, are not only chimerical: in [2]
the authors have shown how to successfully spoof a laptop
authentication system using only a printed photograph.
Since face spoofing attracted the attention of the biomet-
ric community, a number of publications which address the
problem in different ways have appeared [1]. Possible options
include engaging additional devices to detect if there is a
live person in front of the camera, or asking the user to
respond to some challenge, like making a particular gesture.
However, completely automatic systems which do not rely on
additional hardware and are not intrusive are cheaper and more
convenient for the user.
The development of new algorithms to solve the problem is
not possible without a public database which catalogs many
different types of attacks. The purpose of this paper is two-
fold. Firstly, we introduce a novel publicly available database,
called REPLAY-ATTACK, with three types of attacks and
accompanied by a protocol and a baseline study of its effec-
tiveness in bypassing biometric recognition systems. Secondly,
we study the strength of texture features based on Local Binary
Patters (LBP) to discriminate between real access and a spoof
attack. In support of the idea for reproducible research, the
database is freely available for public use, while the method
is simple and easy to re-implement. Its source code is also
freely available for reproduction of results.
In what follows, we give a brief overview of the state-
of-the-art anti-spoofing measures and the efforts in creating
face spoofing database up to now in Section II. In Section III
we present REPLAY-ATTACK and its companion protocols.
Section IV describes the studied counter-measure, followed by
experimental results in Section V. Conclusions and directions
for future research are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Summary of existing anti-spoofing methods. The existing
anti-spoofing methods generally move towards one of three
directions: analyzing the texture of the image captured by the
sensor, detecting any evidence of liveness on the scene or
combining both approaches together. Focusing on the texture
based methods, the first attempt towards spoofing detection
was made in [3], where the authors argue that the frequency
distributions on the image of a live person and the image
of an attack are different. In [4], the authors decompose the
face image into a specular (reflectance) and diffusion compo-
nent. They conclude that recaptured images show reflectance
characteristics of paper and ink and achieve Equal Error Rate
(EER) of 6.7%. Using the Lambertian reflectance model and
Difference of Gaussians (DoG) filtering, [5] extracts two types
of latent samples which are representatives of the texture of the
image. The algorithms achieves an Area Under the ROC Curve
(AUC) value of 0.95. The DoG approach is also employed
in [6], where the image is processed with 4 DoG filters with
different values of σ and the achieved EER is 17%.
Most recently, the approach proposed in [7] exploits yet
another texture feature, LBP. Each image is represented with a
feature vector which is a concatenation of a LBPu216,2 histogram
over the whole image, LBPu28,1 histograms of 9 overlapping
blocks in which the image is divided, and a LBPu28,1 histogram
over the whole image. In the notation LBPu2P,R, the superscript
stands for uniform LBP, while the subscripts refer to the
number of points P which form the LBP code and are taken
on a circle of radius R around the central pixel. The resulting
multi-scale LBP based feature vectors have dimensionality of
833 and are fed to an SVM for a final classification.
Another category of anti-spoofing methods focus on detec-
tion of a live-face specific motion on the scene, such as eye-
blinking, mouth movements or head movements. Examples
of methods using eye-blinking detection are proposed in [8]
and [9]. There are a number of publications which analyze
specific properties of the human head as a 3D object and its
movements, like [10] or [11]. Both methods use optical flow
field for motion estimation and report EER of 0.5% and HTER
of 10% respectively. [12] states that in the case of an attack
using a photograph, there should be high correlation between
the total amount of movement in the face region and the scene
background. The algorithm achieves HTER of 8.98%.
Most of the mentioned papers test their methods on attacks
with printed photographs. Both motion-based and texture-
based anti-spoofing measures have confirmed their discrim-
inability in such cases. In this work we go one step further: we
exploit the capabilities of texture-based features to reveal the
difference between real accesses and attacks with photographs
and videos.
Summary of existing face spoofing databases. Many of
the previously mentioned papers test their proposed counter-
measures on databases which they have developed, but are not
publicly available. The lack of publicly available databases
and protocols obstructs fair evaluation and comparison of the
different anti-spoofing methods. The first database designed
specifically for development of anti-spoofing algorithms, is
the NUAA Photograph Imposter Database (from this point
onwards referred as NUAA) which accompanies [5] and
consists only of attacks with printed photographs. Its main
disadvantage, besides the limited number of identities (15 in
total), is the provision of still images instead of videos, which
makes it unusable for motion-based algorithms. The protocol
provided by NUAA can not be considered as complete,
because it contains only training and test data and overlooks
development data for fine tuning of the classifiers. In [6]
the authors propose a face anti-spoofing database (from this
point onward referred as CASIA-FASD) with three types of
attacks: warped printed photographs, printed photographs with
perforated eye regions and a video playbacks. In a certain
sense, CASIA-FASD can be considered as an addendum of
NUAA database, solving its two main drawbacks and adding
attacks with video playbacks. However, it inherits the lack of a
complete protocol. PRINT-ATTACK [12] is the first database
which provides precise protocol with training, development
and test set. It contains videos of attacks only with printed
photographs to 50 different identities.
A database adequate for developing anti-spoofing algo-
rithms should provide attacks capable of penetrating unpro-
tected face recognition systems. Each database should provide
an evaluation of the scores that a baseline face recognition
system generates for spoof attacks to one identity. So far,
NUAA and CASIA-FASD databases do not provide such
evidence.
In Section III we present REPLAY-ATTACK, a novel face-
spoofing database targeting to challenge the most advanced
spoofing counter-measures. Not only it enriches PRINT-
ATTACK by adding more diverse spoofing attacks, but it also
provides a protocol for fair counter-measure comparison and
proves the vulnerability of a face recognition system to its
attacks.
III. THE REPLAY-ATTACK DATABASE
The REPLAY-ATTACK biometric (face) database1 consists
of short video recordings of both real-access and attack
attempts to 50 different identities. In this section we give the
setup for database recording, describe the set of companion
protocols and evaluate the effectiveness of the collected at-
tacks.
Setup for database recording. To create the dataset each
person recorded a number of videos at 2 different stationary
conditions: (1) controlled (the background of the scene is
uniform and the light of a fluorescent lamp illuminates the
scene); and (2) adverse (the background of the scene is non-
uniform and day-light illuminates the scene). People were
asked to sit down in front of a custom acquisition system built
on an Apple 13-inch MacBook laptop and capture two video
sequences with a resolution of 320 by 240 pixels (QVGA), at
25 frames-per-second and of 15 seconds each (375 frames).
The acquisition process is the same as for the PRINT-ATTACK
database and it is thoroughly described in [12].
Collecting samples and generating the attacks. Under
the same illumination and background settings used for real-
access video clips, the acquisition operator took two high-
resolution pictures of each person using a 12.1 megapixel
Canon PowerShot SX150 IS camera and with an iPhone 3GS
(3.1 megapixel camera), that would be used as basis for the
spoofing attempts. To realize the attacks, the operator forges an
attack as described in one of the following scenarios: (1) print
(the operator displays hard copies of the high-resolution digital
photographs printed on plain A4 paper using a Triumph-
Adler DCC 2520 color laser printer); (2) mobile (the operator
displays photos and videos taken with the iPhone using the
iPhone screen); and (3) highdef (the operator displays the
high-resolution digital photos and videos using an iPad screen
with resolution (1024 by 768 pixels). Each attack video is
captured for about 10 seconds in two different attack modes:
1http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
Fig. 1. Examples of real accesses and attacks in different scenarios. In the
top row, samples from controlled scenario. In the bottom row, samples from
adverse scenario. Columns from left to right show examples of real access,
printed photograph, mobile phone and tablet attacks.
(1) hand-based attacks (the operator holds the attack media or
device using their own hands); and (2) fixed-support attacks
(the operator sets the attack device on a fixed support so they
do not move during the spoof attempt). The first set of (hand-
based) attacks show a shaking behavior which can sometimes
trick eye-blinking detectors [8]. Figure 1 shows some frames
of the captured spoofing attempts.
Protocols. The total set of videos in the database is decom-
posed into 3 subsets allowing for training, development and
testing of binary classifiers. Identities for each subset were
chosen randomly, but do not overlap, i.e. people that are on
one of the subsets do not appear in any other set. Moreover,
each attack subset can be sub-classified into two groups
that split the attacking support used during the acquisition
(hand-based or fixed-support). Counter-measures developed
using this database can report error figures that consider both
separated and aggregated grouping, from which it is possible
to understand which types of attacks are better handled by the
proposed method. Table I summarizes the number of videos
taken for both real-access and attack attempts and how they
are split in the different subsets and groups.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF VIDEOS IN EACH DATABASE SUBSET. NUMBERS DISPLAYED
AS SUMS INDICATE THE AMOUNT OF HAND-BASED AND FIXED-SUPPORT
ATTACKS AVAILABLE IN EACH SUBSET WHEN RELEVANT.
Type Train Devel. Test Total
Real-access 60 60 80 200
Print-attack 30+30 30+30 40+40 100+100
Phone-Attack 60+60 60+60 80+80 200+200
Tablet-Attack 60+60 60+60 80+80 200+200
Total 360 360 480 1200
In the case the developed counter-measure requires training,
it is recommended that training and development samples are
used to train classifiers. One trivial example is to use the
training set for training the classifier itself and the development
data to estimate when to stop training. The test set should be
solely used to report error rates and performance curves.
Effectiveness of Attacks. The REPLAY-ATTACK database
provides an extra set of 100 videos that are not part of the
“spoofing” scenarios defined above. The videos correspond to
enrollment sequences for each of the 50 clients, in the two
illumination conditions as described above. The enrollment
videos are grouped respecting the same definitions for the
data in spoofing attacks - identities do not overlap between
training, development and test subsets. The videos should be
used to train a baseline face-recognition classifier which can
then be used to estimate the quality of attacks contained in
the database.
IV. ANATOMY OF THE STUDIED COUNTER-MEASURE
Simple visual inspection of an image of a real user and a
recaptured image of the same user shows that the two images
can be very similar and even the human eye may find it
difficult to make a distinction at first glance (see Figure 1).
Yet, some disparities between the real face and spoof-attack
images may become evident once the images are translated
into a proper feature space. These differences come from
the fact that the human face as a 3D object, as well as
the human skin, have their own optical qualities (absorption,
reflection, scattering, refraction), which other materials (paper,
photographic paper or electronic display) do not possess [13].
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the texture properties
of real accesses and spoof-attacks will be different.
In this work, we try to capture the texture properties of the
images with features based on the Local Binary Patterns (LBP)
operator introduced in [14]. The most simple LBP pattern for
a particular pixel, usually denoted as LBP3×3, is formed by
comparing the intensity values of that pixel with the intensity
values of the pixels in its 3x3 neighborhood. In this way, each
pixel is assigned a label with value from 0 to 28 − 1. In the
case of uniform LBP (LBPu2), only the labels which contain
at most two 0-1 or 1-0 transitions are considered. The feature
vector of an image, or a region of the image, is formed by
calculating a histogram of the pixel labels.
Figure 2 displays a flow diagram for a complete overview
of the counter-measure. The feature vectors are computed per
frame. In this way, each frame of the videos in REPLAY-
ATTACK and CASIA-FASD databases is considered as an
independent sample in both training and testing sets. This
choice enables fair comparison with the NUAA database
which only provides images. The computed feature vectors
apply to face bounding boxes normalized to 64x64 pixels.
Unfortunately, the face detection process is not error free. In
case a certain frame in the input video stream presents no
detected face, the face detection is borrowed from any previous
frame which had one. If there is no previous frame with
detected face, the frame is discarded from further analysis.
The feature vector which is used for spoofing detection in
this work is a simple normalized histogram of LBPu23×3 codes,
as opposed to the concatenation of more complex parametrized
LBP proposed in [7]. As depicted in Figure 2, we calculate
the LBP histogram in two different ways, and perform all
the experiments separately on the both versions of the feature
vectors. The first option is to calculate the LBP features for
all pixels in the image and distribute them in one histogram
(per-image calculated features). In this case, the total number
classifier
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed LBP based anti-spoofing algorithm
of bins in the histogram, and thus the number of dimensions
of the feature vector is 59. The second option is to divide the
image into 3x3 blocks, calculate the LBP histograms for each
of the blocks separately and form the final feature vector by
their concatenation (per-block computed features). This results
in a feature vector with 531 dimensions. The motivation for
using blocks comes from the fact that the texture artifacts of
the spoof attacks may be more visible in small and local
uniform areas of the image, such as the forehead or the
cheeks [7].
Our work also includes experimentation with alternative
LBP features, namely, the set of extended LBP as proposed
in [15]. It includes transitional (tLBP), direction-coded (dLBP)
and modified LBP (mLBP). The tLBP operator forms the
binary patterns by comparing two consecutive neighboring
pixels of the central pixel circularly in clockwise direction.
The dLBP encodes the intensity variation along the four base
directions through the central pixel in two bits. The mLBP,
similarly to Modified Census Transform (MCT) features pro-
posed in [16], compares the values of the neighboring pixels
to the average of the intensity values in the 3x3 neighborhood.
Unlike MCT, it discards the comparison of the central pixel
with the average from the final code.
Since the feature vectors that we obtain from the images
are histograms, the first classifier applied to the extracted
features is χ2 histogram comparison. We create reference
histograms for the real accesses by averaging the histograms
of the corresponding training samples. Reference histogram
of attacks is not considered because the attacks are of many
different types and hence their mean histogram is not a good
overall representative of the cluster of attacks. Then, the
feature vectors of the probe images are assigned a score as
a result of χ2 comparison with the reference histogram. A
similar approach has already shown very good performance
on the PRINT-ATTACK database [17].
More complex classifiers were examined as well: a linear
one, Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and a non-linear
one, Support Vector Machine (SVM) with radial kernel basis
function.
The studied algorithm is implemented using the free signal-
processing and machine learning toolbox Bob2 [18] and the
source code of the algorithm is available as an anti-spoofing
satellite package3.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we give a performance evaluation of the
studied anti-spoofing algorithm. Before proceeding with the
experiments, we give an overview of the methodology we
use to report the results and we report on the effectiveness
of the attacks in REPLAY-ATTACK to spoof a baseline face
recognition system.
A. Performance measure
A spoofing detection system is subject to two types of
errors, either the real access is rejected (false rejection) or
an attack is accepted (false acceptance). Its performance is
often measured with Half Total Error Rate (HTER), which
is half of the sum of the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and
the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). Since both the FAR and
the FRR depend on a threshold τ , increasing the FAR will
usually reduce the FRR and vice-versa. For this reason, results
are often presented using the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve, which plots the FAR versus the FRR for different
values of τ . Another widely used measure is the Equal Error
Rate (EER), defined as the point along the ROC curve where
the FAR equals the FRR. The threshold τ should be chosen
on the development set and the HTER reported using the test
set. As means of uniforming reports, we recommend choosing
the threshold τ on the EER at the development set.
B. Measuring the effectiveness of the attacks
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the REPLAY-ATTACK
spoofs to get through a face recognition system, we imple-
mented a Parts-Based Gaussian Mixture Model (PB-GMM)
baseline4 [19]. According to a recent experimental evaluation
2http://www.idiap.ch/software/bob/
3Code available at: https://github.com/bioidiap/antispoofing.lbp
4Code available at: https://github.com/bioidiap/antispoofing.verification.
gmm
TABLE II
HTER (%) OF CLASSIFICATION WITH χ2 FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF LBP FEATURES
LBPu23×3 tLBP dLBP mLBP
dev test dev test dev test dev test
31.24 34.01 29.37 35.35 36.71 40.26 32.29 33.68
of face recognition methods [20], this method provides a
trade-off in terms of complexity and performance accuracy.
For this system, if one sets a threshold on the EER of
the development set, the number of attacks that would be
incorrectly classified as clients would be slightly above 82%.
This validates the attacks in REPLAY-ATTACK as valuable for
further investigation of counter-measures. As no enrollment
data is provided for NUAA and CASIA-FASD databases, it is
not possible to do such an evaluation for these databases.
C. Performance evaluation of the studied anti-spoofing algo-
rithm
We provide a number of performance evaluation tables
which give the results of the classification with respect to
different criteria. Firstly, we compare the effectiveness of the
different types of LBP to detect spoofing attacks. Secondly,
taking only the best-performing type of LBP from the first
experiment, we compare the performance of features computed
per-image and per-block. Our third experiment evaluates the
classification methods. It also compares the algorithm’s per-
formance to the reimplementation of the algorithm proposed
in [7]. Finally, we apply the studied counter-measure and the
algorithm given in [7] to all the available databases.
Comparison of the types of LBP. Inspired by the per-
formance that the χ2 statistics based classifier has shown on
attacks with printed photographs [17], we made an evaluation
of regular LBPu23×3 and the extended set of LBP [15] using
this classification method on REPLAY-ATTACK. The HTER
of the classification for both the development and test set for
per-image computed LBP histograms is given in Table II.
Although very efficient for printed spoofing attacks, proba-
bly due to apparent printing artifacts, LBP is not as discrimina-
tive with the other types of attacks in REPLAY-ATTACK. As
it can be seen from Table II, the lowest HTER on the test set
is achieved by using mLBP, followed by LBPu23×3. Despite the
very tight superiority of mLBP over LBPu23×3, we will continue
the further evaluation only using LBPu23×3. The motivation for
this lies in the fact that LBPu23×3 is much more commonly used
then mLBP and this makes the comparison of the algorithms
more consistent. Furthermore, computing mLBP requires one
additional operation for calculating the average of the intensity
values in the 3x3 neighborhood of a given pixel.
Per-image vs. per-block calculated features. Our second
experiment compares the performance of χ2 classifier with
respect to the features computed per-image and per-block.
Their dimensions are 59 and 531 respectively. The results
are given in Table III. We can conclude that enlarging the
feature vector 9 times does not improve the performance, as
the HTER in the first case is about the same as in the second
case on both development and test set. Therefore, in the rest
of the experiments with REPLAY-ATTACK we will consider
only the features computed on the full image, which is more
optimal in terms of computational and memory resources.
TABLE III
HTER (%) OF CLASSIFICATION WITH χ2 FOR LBP CODES COMPUTED
PER-IMAGE AND PER-BLOCK
per-image LBPu23×3 per-block LBPu23×3
dev test dev test
31.24 34.01 33.66 34.30
Comparison of the classifiers. In the following experiment,
we compare the simple χ2 statistics method to more sophis-
ticated classifiers (LDA and SVM). We also reimplemented
the algorithm proposed in [7], where the feature vector with
length of 833 is composed of concatenated LBP histograms
and the used classifier is also a SVM. The results are given
in Table IV .
While the improvement of the results when using LDA over
the classification with χ2 is notable, introducing non-linearity
with SVM into the classification system decreases the HTER
on the test set by only 2%. This comes with the cost of a
very large SVM with a lot of support vectors, which means
low computational performance during the classification. For
example, the total number of support vectors is 25717 for
feature vectors of length 59. Features proposed in [7] bring
additional improvement of 1.3%, but they are 14 times bigger
then our features and the total size of the SVM is even larger
in this case.
Performance of the algorithm on different databases. Fi-
nally, in Table V we present the performance of the algorithm
on all the available face-spoofing databases. As an addition,
we report the results that we obtained with the reimplemented
version of the method proposed in [7].
It should be remarked that, due to the lack of develop-
ment set on NUAA and CASIA-FASD databases, the only
option was to evaluate the algorithm using cross-validation by
randomly dividing the training data into 5 folds. The results
presented for these databases are actually the average HTER
on the test set over 5 iterations of the algorithm with different
folds playing the role of a development set.
It is also interesting to point out that when experimenting
with NUAA and CASIA-FASD, better results were achieved
with per-block computed features. Therefore, in Table V, the
features for REPLAY-ATTACK are computed per-image, while
the features for the other two databases are computed per-
block.
TABLE IV
HTER (%) OF CLASSIFICATION WITH DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS
LBPu23×3 + χ2 LBPu23×3 + LDA LBPu23×3 + SVM LBP [7] + SVM
dev test dev test dev test dev test
31.24 34.01 19.60 17.17 14.84 15.16 13.90 13.87
TABLE V
HTER (%) OF THE CLASSIFICATION ON DIFFERENT DATABASES. THE AVERAGE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE HTER OVER THE 5 CROSS-FOLD
VALIDATION ITERATIONS ON NUAA AND CASIA-FASD IS AT MOST 1%. ∗FEATURES REPLICATED FROM [7] USING BOB AND CLASSIFICATION
PERFORMED USING BOB. ‡RESULT REPORTED IN [7]: FEATURES GENERATED USING THE MATLAB IMPLEMENTATION OF LBP AND CLASSIFICATION
PERFORMED USING LIBSVM. §FEATURES FROM [7] PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CLASSIFICATION PERFORMED USING BOB.
REPLAY-ATTACK NUAA CASIA-FASD
dev test dev test dev test
LBPu23×3 + LDA 19.60 17.17 0.06 18.32 17.08 21.01
LBPu23×3 + SVM 14.84 15.16 0.11 19.03 16.00 18.17
LBP [7] + SVM ∗ 13.90 13.87 0.11 13.17 15.43 18.21
LBP [7] + SVM ‡ - - - 2.5 - -
LBP [7] + SVM § - - 3.21 4.23 - -
From Table V, we discuss three crucial matters. Firstly,
we observe the generalization capabilities of the algorithm
on the NUAA database. Secondly, we examine the gain in
precision versus the complexity of the classifier. Lastly, we
highlight a disparity between the results obtained with our
reimplementation of the method in [7] and the results reported
by the authors.
The first thing to notice in Table V is the tendency of
the classifiers to overfit on the training set of the NUAA
database. Both LDA and SVM yield high performance on the
development set, but are less effective on the test set. This
can be explained by the fact that the classification threshold is
chosen on the development set, which for NUAA is actually
a subset of the training set, as we perform cross-validation.
This problem can be taken as an indication for the necessity
of a precise protocol with separate training, development and
test set in spoof-attack databases.
From Table V we can also observe that the non-linear
classifier gives just minor improvement over LDA not only in
REPLAY-ATTACK, as shown before, but also on NUAA and
CASIA databases. Moreover, expanding the feature vector to
very high dimensionality like in [7] does not guarantee good
generalization for NUAA, nor does help for better performance
on CASIA database.
Table V contains two additional rows. The first one is
the HTER on the NUAA database as reported in [7]. We
can observe that there is a difference between the HTER we
obtained by reimplementing the method in [7] (13.17%) and
the reported value (2.5%). Therefore, we asked the authors
to send us, for comparison purposes, their features generated
using the Matlab implementation of LBP5. The last row of
Table V gives the HTER of the algorithm that we obtained
with the features they provided to us, and it amounts 4.23%.
The small difference between this value and the value reported
5http://www.cse.oulu.fi/CMV/Downloads/LBPMatlab
in the paper is probably due to a different cross-validation
schemes in the both settings. However, the question remains
what causes the disparity between the results obtained with
the two implementations.
After thorough investigation, we found that the Matlab im-
plementation of LBP responds unexpectedly in certain condi-
tions. On the contrary, the LBP implementation of Bob appears
to handle these conditions correctly. Namely, when calculating
the circular LBPu28,1 and LBP
u2
16,2 required for the features
in [7], there is a need for calculating interpolated values of
particular points in the image. The Matlab implementation
of LBP does not handle correctly bilinear interpolation in
some cases due to precision problems, leading to completely
different LBP codes. The anomaly seems to affect ∼4% of
the LBP codes for some of the test images. We informed the
authors about this issue for further investigation, especially to
understand why the anomaly produces better performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Spoofing and anti-spoofing has become a prevalent topic
in the biometrics community. Regardless of the sophistication
of a particular face recognition system, it should not be
completely trusted if it does not have a protection against
spoofing attacks.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows. Firstly, it introduces REPLAY-ATTACK, a novel
spoofing attack database containing three types of possi-
ble attacks using three different media and two different
recording conditions. The database includes a protocol for
training, development and testing purposes, and also proves
the vulnerability of a baseline face recognition system to its
attacks. Secondly, it proposes simple and easily reproducible
LBP based face spoofing counter-measure and explores its
efficiency against a variety of attacks. Variants of LBP were
also investigated, but the regular LBPu23×3 shows the best
performance/complexity tradeoff. The simple setup and low-
dimensional features manage to reach reasonable performance
even without using complex non-linear classifiers whose size
can be inconvenient for fast computation. In support of re-
producible research, the database, its protocols, as well as the
source code will be made publicly available.
The LBP based anti-spoofing method guarantees different
levels of certainty for different types of attacks and different
databases. Some attacks can deceive this counterfeit more
easily then others. There is no consistency in the results
with regards to the types of attacks, nor the attacks from
different databases. Our belief is that this is not valid only
for texture-based methods, but also for methods that approach
the problem from different aspect. The various face spoofing
attacks differ from the real accesses in their own particular
manner: the devices that are used introduce different artifacts
and the amount and type of movement they possess is different.
In other words, the cues that distinguish two different types
of face spoofing attacks from real accesses differ in their
essence and should be grasped in their own unique way.
There is not a single notion which describes all the types of
attacks. Hence, we believe that the future work in the field
of anti-spoofing should focus on addressing as more spoofing
attacks as possible with separate attack-specific approaches.
Another option is to congregate the characteristics of all the
real accesses into a single model to which none of the spoofing
attacks will relate in any sense.
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